PRIMARY RESEARCH
Initial research on the course of events.
The starting point for this project was the book Cherekskaya Tragedy (K.G. Azamatov, M.O. Temirzhanov, B.B. Temukuev, A.I. Tetuev, I.M. Chechenov; 1994). It is the first (and so far the only) complete collection of information about the genocide in the KBR. It highlights the background of events, a detailed description of actions and consequences. Also, it contains an impressive amount of archival data, photographs, and witnesseses' stories.

This material is fundamental, so I made a full summary of it.
Cherek Tragedy (K.G. Azamatov, M.O. Temirzhanov, B.B. Temukuev, A.I. Tetuev, I.M. Chechenov; 1994).

Outline.
- July 1992 - The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the KBR, at the suggestion of the Nygysh organization and the public of the republic, established The Commission for the study of the events that took place in the Cherek Gorge in November 1942.

- According to the rule adopted by the NKVD, bandits (during the war) are armed persons (groups/individuals) that are listed as gang manifestations. In the conditions of the republic: theft of collective farm cattle, theft of food, the threat of weapons, etc. The exact meaning of the term was hardly specified. The imperfection of the legal apparatus + other factors led to the fact that the department for combating banditry (OBB) of the NKVD KBASSR began to make bandits into account only from January 1943.

STAGES OF THE FORMATION OF "BANDITRY" IN THE CHEREK REGION
I. August - the end of October 1942. The period before the occupation of Kabardino-Balkaria by the Germans.
More or less clearly the problem of desertion in Kabardino-Balkaria manifested itself after the retreat of the 37th Army to the North Caucasus (July-August, the fall of Rostov).

- The return of 600-700 people from the defeated and lost control of the 115th Kabardno-Balkarian Cavalry Division. Many of those who returned lived illegally/semi-legally; some joined the partisans. They were called deserters or «bandits». The archives do not contain data on the national composition of deserters from the 115th Cavalry Division BUT in the certificate “On the state of the Balkarian regions of the KBASSR” directed to the name of L.P. Beria February 23, 1944, Signed by Kumekhov, Bziava, Filatov, it is stated that most of them are Balkars. The falsification was necessary to justify the eviction of the Balkar people.

- In the summer of 1942, there were ~100 deserters in the Cherek Gorge, representatives of different nationalities. Among them: Balkars, Kabardians, Georgians, Ossetians, etc. Fearing criminal liability, they hid in the mountains.

- As a result of the activities of the republican and local authorities, many deserters were legalized. Some were sent to the front, some were imprisoned. Most of the illegal deserters worked on collective farms, harvesting hay, harvesting on farms in the areas of Gozhuk, Karasu, Cheget-zhurt, Khaymash.

- October 14-15, 1952 - Consideration of the issue of banditry at the bureau and plenum of the regional committee of the CPSU (b). The Cherek region was not singled out separately, but a brigade of regional workers was sent there to improve political work. By this time, there were already people in the republic who were serving sentences for desertion. They were persuaded to surrender to the authorities, promising to be re-sent to the front in the general order, but later they were detained for investigation. In August 1942, when the front was approaching, they were released and having been released, they actively campaigned that it was impossible to believe the promises of the authorities, which subsequently played a negative role.

II. Late October - mid-November 1942.
- October 25, 1942 - The offensive of the Germans. The fall of Nalchik, the occupation of most areas. The 37th Army was dismembered and retreated into the mountains, suffering heavy losses.

- The 2nd Guard Rifle Division, under the command of Zakharov, having reached Babugent at the end of October, held the line, ensuring the retreat of army units from the Nalchik regions along the route Izdra (mountain) - Karasu - Babugent - Blue Lakes. From the Blue Lakes, if necessary, it was possible to go to Tashly-Tala and connect with the main forces of the front either along the road through the Cherek Gorge, or the Upper Blue Lakes and the forest. The Circassian Gorge was in the path of the retreating army.

- November 1, 1942 - Major-General Zakharov, appointed military administrator of the district, issued an order that “obliged the NKVD of the Chereksky district to identify the relatives of deserters and take the closest of them hostage. If within two days after that the deserters do not surrender, then the hostages will be shot, and the relatives will be repressed.” This accelerated the transition of deserters into rebels.

- The combat log of the 2nd Guards SD did not record an attack by «bandits» on the Red Army soldiers of this division. There is a record of the murder of 3 «bandits» in the mountains (presumably: civilians Tabun Appaev, Musos Khasuev; the third survived). Same days: the execution of two shepherds from the Bashiev family in the vicinity of Blue Lake. These people are the first victims of the 37th Army.

- Responsiveness. Individual deserters began to disarm small units of the retreating Red Army. Casualties on both sides.

- 1942 - Creation of a fighter detachment to fight groups of deserters and protect the Sukan Gorge. It included: employees of the NKVD, the leadership of the party, and Soviet bodies of the region, headed by the Secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Kh. Eneev and the chairman of the district executive committee M. Mechukaev, some active participants in the formation of Soviet power in Kabardino-Balkaria (including I. M. Zankishiev is a former red partisan who had extensive experience in working with banditry in the 1920s and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner). The detachment was supposed to become the core of the partisan detachment in the Cherek region or become part of the Khulamo-Bezngiev partisan detachment. For certain circumstances/reasons, the tasks were not completed.

- November 4, 1942 - The headquarters of the 37th army moved from the villages Karasu in the Cherek gorge.

- November 5-15, 1942 - The headquarters were in the village Muhol.

- The relationship between the local population and the soldiers of the 37th Army was normal. The Red Army lived in Balkar families. The collective farms of the district supplied the detachment with food. Thanks to the help of local residents, 250 wounded soldiers were transported from the Mukholovka district hospital to Georgia.

- In the valley of the Cherek-Bezengi region, a detachment of the 295th Riffle Division under the command of Captain Bondarev remained «with the task of closing the direction of Bezengi along the valley of the river. Cherek, placing a detachment in the Uskhur area». The Khulamo-Bezengievsky partisan detachment under the command of Kh.K. was attached to the unit Boziev.

- The cover detachment of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD was headed by the commander of the first battalion of the 278th rifle regiment of this division, Captain Fedor Dmitrievich Nakin, «with the task of closing the river valleys». Cherek-Balkar’s direction to the Sarivtsek pass, placing a detachment in the Zylgi area.

- By November 14, in Mukhol, in addition to the headquarters of the 37th Army, there were also the party and Soviet leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria + a joint partisan detachment (commander Tsaryapin, commissar Kuraev), who came from the Baku Gorge.
III. Second half of November 1942 – 28 November 1943.
- Complication of the situation in the Cherek region. Relocation of the headquarters of the 37th army and the united partisan detachment to the villages Tyshly-Tala. A small garrison with the remnants of equipment remained in the Cherek Gorge.

- November 21 (noon) - Skirmish between a group of deserters who were on the slope above Mukhol near the village of Shaurdat, and the garrison located in the building of the district hospital. On the right bank of the Cherek River. Eyewitness accounts differ as to who started the shootout. The deserters had no casualties, but a group of children (mostly from Shaurdat) stood next to them. 2 girls were injured.
The main object of shelling was the building of the House of Soviets of the Cherek region. At the time of the start of the shootout in the building were: the first secretary of the RK VKP (b) Eneev, police detective of the Cherek RO NKVD A. Tumenov, deputy. Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the KBASSR M. Bachiev, former judge of the Cherek district Kh. Zammaev, chairman of the Cherek district executive committee M. Mechukuev, prosecutor of the Cherek district M. Chochaev.

M. Mechukuev and M. Chochaev (possibly + Kh. Zammaev) left on their own initiative towards Shaurdat for negotiations with the deserters. Did not return. According to documentary evidence, Chochaev nevertheless returned but was accompanied by deserters. There were two opinions: the parliamentarians were in cahoots with the deserters OR Mechukuev and his comrades were detained by the deserters. The parliamentarians were convicted according to the first version, but they themselves adhered to the second. Assumption: Mechukuev, Chochaev, and Zammaev left to persuade the deserters but were detained (or succumbed to persuasion).

There were no Red Army soldiers in Mukhol. Deserters surrounded the House of Soviets. Tumenov was detained by the attackers and transferred to Shaurdat, from there to Upper Balkaria. Eneev and Bachiev hid in the basement, were not found by the deserters, and left the building at night. Not finding the secretary and deputy chairman, the deserters set fire to the building. According to the testimonies of witnesses, they first took away the grain stored there, but there is no mention of it in the acts.

The main purpose of the attack on the House of Soviets (according to eyewitnesses) was the capture of Khamid Eneev. Reason: in late August-early September 1942. Mukhadin Tauluev, the assistant to the first secretary of the Cherek RK AUCP(b), was killed under unclear circumstances when he was returning from Zylga to Mukhol with H. Eneev. At night, an ambush of the fighters of the extermination detachment was set up at the place of the murder, which was run into (and killed) by an unarmed resident of Zylga - Boziev. The deserters denied their involvement in the murder and intended to take revenge on Eneev because he wanted to make them responsible for the death of Tauluev.

- Detachment P.V. Tura (since April 1942 - head of the department for combating banditry of the NKVD KBASSR) also made attempts to attribute the murder of civilians to deserters and thus turn the population of the Cherek Gorge against them. The murder of Ramazan Ittiev and Idris Daduev by his men received wide publicity.

- After the burning of the House of Soviets, deserters besieged the district hospital, where a small garrison headed by Captain Lyashchenko was located. Kh. Eneev and M. Bachiev were also here.

- November 22-23 - a shootout between deserters and army units in the Cherek Gorge.

- According to archival documents, deserters seized an anti-aircraft gun with a crew that, under the threat of weapons, was forced to fire at the building of the district executive committee. The crew was shot dead for failing to comply with the demands of the deserters, but two managed to escape. According to eyewitnesses, the fighters still fired two shots. BUT, according to Adalbi Tumenov, the gun crew was arrested and was in custody with him. There were 4-5 of them (Georgians), there is no information about their further fate.

- According to the headquarters of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD, for four days (November 21-24) of an open confrontation, the parties suffered losses:
«companions» - 5 people were killed and 4 wounded, 5 horses were killed, 2 machine guns and 2 rifles were lost
opponents - 30 people destroyed

The last number is clearly exaggerated. Leaving the hospital, the soldiers shot several more people who had been detained in different places. The names of four of them have been established: Ogurlu Misirov, Safar Misirov, Bullukh Etcheev, Ismail Sarakuev.

- After the deserters captured the district center of the village of Mukhol, an anti-aircraft gun and killed several Red Army soldiers near the village of Sautu, the command of the 37th Army gave the order to destroy the «bandit rebel movement» in Central Balkaria. Referring to this and (supposedly) to the verbal order of the commander of the 37th Army, Kozlov, “to wipe out the village of Srednyaya Balkaria from the face of the earth, regardless of anything,” given by phone, Shikin (commander of the 11th NKVD Rifle Division) on November 22 at 16.00 issued a combat order (execution was entrusted to the commander of the 4th squadron of the 17th cavalry regiment Karataev):

«With the receipt of an order to go to Central Balkaria to connect with Captain Lyashchenko with the task of liquidating the bandit group located in the village Upper Balkaria. Take the most decisive measures, up to execution on the spot, burning their buildings and property.»

- November 24 - Nakin’s detachment headed for the Cherek Gorge, leaving positions to the detachment of Captain Bondarev. On the way, people they met were detained and shot. Among them were: Ibragim Boziev, Kichinau Shukaev, Lokman Zashaev, Mustafa Glashev, Aubekir Karkaev. They were not bandits. Also, the command was reported that the fighters of the detachment destroyed another 10 «bandits» as a result of the battle, but this was not true.

- Night of November 24-25 - all parts of the 37th Army, together with equipment, left the Cherek Gorge. Fuel was delivered by air.

- 2:30, November 25 - Captain Nakin’s detachment, the 3rd squadron of the 17th command post of the 11th NKVD Rifle Division, and the material of the army left the hospital in the direction of the plywood factory. According to the reports, the vehicles were sent through the «Salty» (Sautu) to the pass with a fight.

- November 25 - Shikin’s second order. He ordered Captain Lyashchenko to immediately unite the entire personnel, regardless of the units located in the Middle Balkaria. «Wage the most decisive struggle against the bandits and their accomplices, destroy the bandits and their accomplices on the spot, completely burn buildings and their property, destroy everything that can revive the soil for banditry. In no case should you show pity even to indirect accomplices.»

«If you have the opportunity to take hostages (relatives of the bandits), then deliver them to Fan. factory, and if necessary, destroy it on the spot, widely announcing this to the population.»

«Seize the cannon 772 ap, located in the Salta area.»

Lyashchenko did not have time to start executing the order, because. the troops had already left the Cherek Gorge and were on their way to the plywood factory.

The formula used in the order - «bandits and their accomplices» - gave unlimited opportunities for committing acts of lawlessness.
- 6:00, November 26 - vehicles and accompanying parts arrived in the valley of the river. Psygansu and concentrated in the area of ​​the plywood factory.

- 8:00, November 26 - Commander Shikin and chief of staff Tyazhelov of the 11th SD of the NKVD issue a third order, in the main points repeating the previous ones, not executed by Lyashchenko and Karatav. The case was entrusted to Captain Nakin, who was ordered with a detachment of 150-200 people to immediately go to the Cherek Gorge with the task of eliminating the gang, capturing a cannon, and restoring order in the villages of Mukhol, Salty, and Upper Balkaria. Also ordered:

“Wage the most resolute, merciless struggle against the bandits and their accomplices, destroy them on the spot, completely burn buildings and property, destroy everything that can revive the soil for banditry.
Never show pity...
Take hostages (relatives of bandits) during hostilities”

- 14:00 November 26 - Nakin went to the Cherek Gorge with a detachment of 152 people, formed from the 1st battalion of the 278th rifle regiment and the 3rd squadron of the 17th cavalry regiment of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD. The headquarters of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD informed the headquarters of the 37th army about everything.

!According to the headquarters of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD on November 26! That is, the losses were reported after the withdrawal of all units from the Cherek Gorge when it became possible to determine this in a calm environment. Three days later, in a combat report, the command of the 37th Army confirmed these data, specifying:

“Our losses on November 21-26, 1942 in the fight against banditry in the Mukhol-Salty region. Killed - 5, wounded - 4, horses - 5; an attack by bandits on a pass without fuel, a 35 mm cannon with a crew of one, machine guns - 2, rifles - 2, measures to return the materiel have been taken. An investigation is underway.»

These figures were later heavily distorted.

- From operational reports: shot residents of the Cherek Gorge on November 24 (+ on the night of November 25th) - 12. Nine of them are already mentioned above, the rest are not established. Perhaps two of them are Kyuchuk Kabardokov and Mustafa Taumurzaev.

- On November 24, the number of «gangs» operating in the region of Middle Balkaria was estimated by the headquarters of the 11th Riffle Division of the NKVD at 200-300 people. It was indicated that the «gang» «occupied the dominant heights around Mukhol and Silty.»

MAIN ACTIONS
- Incidents in the Cherek region were not unusual phenomenon for the republic. At the IX Plenum of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held on October 15, 1942, in Nalchik, there were facts of looting in individual villages (collective farm cattle, furniture from institutions, grain, and unthreshed bread were stolen) long before the arrival of the Germans. In the Cherek Gorge, this manifested itself with the use of weapons, which led to casualties.

- The afternoon of November 26 - Residents of the village of Nizhny Cheget (in the past - cavalrymen of the 115th Cavalry Division) were detained on the road between the villages. Zylgi and N. Cheget of three partisans (commander of the Urvan partisan detachment Aliev, Tkhazeplov, and Kumykov), marching from the Blue Lake. Delivered to Zylgi, from there forwarded to Cheget. They were disarmed but treated well. One of the detainees hid his documents in V. Cheget and after the stabilization of the situation took them away.

- November 27 - By 10 am, Captain Nakin’s detachment took up its starting position at the pass, 3 kilometers from Sautu. The start of the operation was scheduled for 23:00.

- In parallel with Nakin, the joint partisan detachment (OPO) was supposed to carry out an operation to liberate Upper Zhemtala, captured by the Germans.

- Nakin’s unit was noticed by a resident of Glashevo, but his fellow villagers did not attach any importance to his fears.
In the Cherek gorge, the funeral ceremonies for those shot on the roads and near the hospital had not yet been completed.

- Toward evening, Nakin’s detachment, divided into 2 unequal groups, headed from the Sukan Pass to the Cherek Gorge along the banks of the river Khashki. The left-bank group - the main one, was led by Nakin and headed for Sauta. Right-bank group - about 30-40 people (according to eyewitnesses); Who was in charge is unknown.
- Nakin detained two residents of Upper Balkaria, he wanted to shoot them. They ran away. Passing through Sauta, they warned the deserters (at that time gathered in one house; ~ 15 people) about the approach of an aggressive detachment. Believing that they were the only target of the soldiers, they left the village without prior warning to their fellow villagers.

In the village of Sautu, there was not a single person left with a weapon capable of resisting. In Glashevo, according to archival data and information from local residents, there have never been any bandits or deserters.

- Local residents claim that on the way to Sauta, Nakin sent two Red Army soldiers from his detachment to the village of Kurnayat. Against his orders, they warned the inhabitants of the danger and allowed them to escape.

- The operation began when most of the inhabitants had already disappeared. Captain Nakin gave the order to Korotaev’s group to capture Sauta on the right, and the first company on the left. The fighters threw grenades into the windows of houses, broke doors and windows, and broke into the houses of civilians in the village. The elderly, women, and children were taken out. They shot. They dragged the corpses and burned them along with the houses. Hostages were taken. Shot.

- Archival documents of the 37th army testify to the innocent victims. Memorandum from the senior political instructor Seskov to the head of the political department of the 37th army, Comrade Osadchy:

“... in the collective farm. Sarbashev, the entire Sarbashev family, which was not connected with the gang, was shot. Sarbashev was himself killed by bandits in 1930, after whom the collective farm was named. Such cases were not isolated. Many corpses were found in separate huts, because the inhabitants fled from fear to one house, and threw grenades through the windows exterminated to a single person.

It was established by name that 310 people were shot in the village of Sautu, including children under 16 (150).

- In Glashevo, soldiers entered houses and killed everyone who was in them. Due to the darkness, not all adults and the wounded were seen. In the ancestral village of Glashevo, 67 people were killed, including children under 16 (5). Only 8 inhabitants remained alive in the village, three of whom died of wounds within a year. Of those who accompanied the soldiers, the locals identified several partisans (Balkarians) connected with Glashevo and Verkhny Cheget by family / other ties and who had visited the village before.

- From Glashevo, Nakin’s detachment descended to the village of Verkhniy Cheget (300 m below). A man was sent to Glashevo by civilians, who upon his return claimed that everything was calm there. However, at the same time, two teenagers went there. Returning to Upper Cheget, they told about the tragedy. Residents of Nizhny Cheget began to hastily leave their homes and cross to the left bank of the Cherek. On the way, they warned the people of the villages of Temukuev and Zylgi. By dawn, they all began to climb the mountains. The inhabitants of Upper Cheget remained where they were.

- There were 2-3 armed men in Verkhniy Cheget. The mother of one of the former fighters of the 115th Kabardino-Balkarian Cavalry Division (at the time described, a fighter of the Nakin detachment) Aslan Nastaev was from Verkhny Cheget. He knew the village and the people who lived in it. For this reason (or for several others) in this village, they tried to destroy exclusively men, selectively. Women who tried to protect their loved ones were shot; 8 inhabitants were killed. Also, people from other villages were brought to Verkhny Cheget and shot.

- After the beginning of the punitive operations of the NKVD, the main population of the Balkar villages went to the mountains. Either very old/sick people remained in the villages or those who believed that they had special merits before the Soviet government. For example, Kabul-Kadyrova. Four sons were at the front. Shot.

- According to archival documents and eyewitnesses, the fighters of the Nakin detachment, when carrying out punitive action against the civilian population in the villages of Upper Balkaria, were engaged in looting: they took away valuables, fabrics, etc.

- At dawn, having set fire to several houses, the detachment hurriedly left the village and went through Khashki to Mukhol, to the hospital building. Together with the soldiers, the partisans Aliev and Tkhazeplov left, upon arrival at Nakin’s headquarters in Sautu, they told about their capture. Kumykov went with the inhabitants to the mountains. The chief accountant of the collective farm and his wife also left Upper Balkaria with the detachment (they lived in the house of Khamid Khubolov). All Russians joined the detachment, they were not touched.

- November 28 - Rumors about what happened in Verkhny Cheget and Glashevo reach Mukhol. A letter was drawn up and sent to the hospital for transmission to the commander to clarify the conditions under which it would be possible to leave the village, houses, and people intact. The letter was written by Khazhdaut Osmanov.

The command demanded within 24 hours to surrender weapons and surrender themselves (signed by General Kalinin). The name of the general was unknown to the inhabitants (+ there were suspicions that the punitive detachment consisted of Germans dressed in the uniform of the Red Army), so it was decided to go to the mountains, and for the younger ones to stay on the slope, in full view of the village. It was impossible to defend Muhol because there were no weapons. The inhabitants of other villages, except for Sautu, also left their homes and climbed into the mountains.

- 20:00, November 28 - Nakin’s first report.

“I report that from 23.00 of the present hour, I am fighting at 5.00 on November 28, 1942. The village of Salty was cleared, and the gang partly from Salta went to the village of V. Balkaria. There are up to 1200 corpses.
1) The strength of the enemy in the village of V. Balkaria, there are up to 150 people according to the hostages. Armament rifle camp and manual machine guns and a cannon, an attempt to seize V. Balkaria bogged down.
2) According to the hostages, there are 80 people in Muhol. German submachine gunners and up to 200 armed bandit; also, they say they have guns.
At 1600, Muhol received an ultimatum from the enemy, which I am sending you. The enemy’s plan to master all methods and saddle the road leading to the plywood factory, this plan of the enemy was established by observation.
I have losses of 2 Red Army soldiers and 5 wounded. Decided to master the road going to the plywood factory, and heights 3150. Take up the all-around defense of the village of Silty.

I await further instructions.
I bring to your attention that starting from the village of Zylgi and ending with the village of Shkanty, the population has completely revolted.”

** The population simply left their homes, they did not become rebels.

!!! A group of German machine gunners could not get into the gorge, because. Babugent was in the hands of Bondarev until the evening of November 3. The entrance to the gorge from V. Zhemtala was controlled by units of the 37th Army and partisans. !!!

- Bandits’ ultimatum sent by Nakin to Shikin:

«Fighters of the Red Army.
On behalf of the headquarters of the united detachment, fighters like you, but who have already recognized and experienced the senseless sacrifices that the highest command staff demand from you, cannot lead to victory. Therefore, we turn to you, comrade. fighters, come out of the cracks of the hospital and come over to our side. The representative of the German army promises to fully save your life and return to your homeland. The condition for surrender is to drop weapons, hands up.
Beginning headquarters - Nogerov
28.XI.42 We are waiting for an answer in 30 minutes»
- A photocopy of the original message was shown to Khazhdaut Osmanov. Authorship is not recognized because the handwriting and content of the note did not match the letter he had written.

- Shikin sends Nakin a walkie-talkie and 10 cavalrymen.

- 12:25, November 29 - Shikin, having received Nakin’s first report, sends him a second order, leaving his first instructions in force and demanding decisive action to fulfill them. Demands through the hostages to establish «the location of the cannon and headquarters of the bandits and the presence of Germans» and under «favorable conditions» to capture the cannon and headquarters, and all «gangs. destroy accomplices with residential buildings. Do not touch children and women. In conclusion: «Indicate what kind of 1200 corpses you indicated in the report and what trophies are available.»

Considering that the headquarters of the 11th SD was at the plywood factory all the time of the operation, Nakin could receive Shikin’s second order either late in the evening of November 29 or in the morning of the next day (which is more likely).

- 13:20, November 29 - Shikin sends a combat report to the headquarters of the 37th Army, in which he details Nakin’s report and his second order, and sends a copy of the ultimatum of the bandits from Mukhol. THE LAST SENTENCE FROM NAKIN’S REPORT IS CHANGED. It was:

“I bring to your attention that starting from the village of Zylgi and ending with the village of Shkanty, the population has completely revolted.”

It became:

“According to the report of the detachment commander, the entire population of Mukhol, Salta, Kasparta, Zilgy, and adjacent settlements rebelled and opposes Soviet power.”

Significant addition: all are rebels. The army offices soon combined the terms and began to call any armed inhabitants of the Cherek Gorge “bandit rebels”.

- 19:00, November 29 - According to the operational report of the headquarters of the 37th Army, a squadron of the 17th Cavalry Regiment was concentrated in Mukhol to combat banditry. They burn houses. The first is the house of Khazhdaut Osmanov. Aliev and Tkhazepov, at the direction of Nakin, took 14 seriously wounded Red Army soldiers from V. Balkaria to a plywood factory; met with Kumekhov and Barsokov and briefed them. Nakin’s detachment was fired upon, which was reported the next day.

- November 30 - Nakin wrote 2 reports. One - to the chief of staff of the 11th SD of the NKVD, Captain Tyazhelov, which reports:

“... I take hostages, I act mercilessly, I destroy the population, and I burn buildings. Upon receipt of the second order, he changed the tactics of destruction.

Also, Nakin claimed that there was no answer to his two ultimatums and it was not possible to collect the cars left in the Cherek Gorge due to the lack of spare parts. Adilbi Tumenov participated in the delivery of the second ultimatum. He was released by deserters and hid in Sauta with relatives. After some time, he ended up at Nakin, later retreated with a detachment, and joined the partisans.

The second report was addressed to Shikin:

“At 5.00 on November 30, 1942, he captured the village of V. Balkaria and Kyunyum. During the day, he led the destruction of the population and buildings... blew up ammunition, about 300 people were killed. During the period from 11/27/42 to 11/30/42, five settlements Upper. Balkaria, Sylty, Kunyum, V. Cheget, and Glashevo were destroyed; the first three of them were burned. Up to 1500 people were killed. On the instructions of the hostages, 90 bandits were killed, 400 (men) capable of carrying weapons, and the rest - were women and children.
Gun taken...

Critics from the calculation of the battery arrived, who were in the gang, Darumanidze, and Kagladze, the latter said that the gang had up to 150 people. On November 29, 1942, a German came, promised to throw up soldiers up to 400 and close the gorge opposite the hospital, they should arrive today or tomorrow...

They have lost 14 wounded and 3 killed.»

Nakin asked for mines and shells for the cannon from Shikin; salt, tobacco, and vodka - at Tyazhelov. I got the products myself. Fulfilling the order regarding the deportation of food products to the division, he asked the commander to «send people to pasture cattle.»

The data on the number of «bandits» from Nakin and those who have been in the «gang» differ significantly.

- November 30 - Shikin replied to the report:

“I find your actions good, and the actions of the fighters wonderful.
If you clear Central Balkaria of this bastard, who, instead of protecting himself from the German invaders, betrayed his homeland, and became bandits yourself, then you will accomplish a deed of great importance - clear the rear of our troops.
I do not set a new task for you, it remains the same, take all measures to fulfill it. Do not forget the cunning of the bandits, do not go to any provocations, force the completion of the task, hold on to skill and cunning, and do not hit on the forehead.
You have a few killed - this is good, but there are too many wounded.
<…>
“...according to the available data - the gang keeps in touch with the Germans in Zhemtala, I will take some measures to cover up this connection.
I am sending you ammunition, tobacco, and salt, return the donkeys immediately, if possible, and load them with what is fashionable from food.

- December 1 - Shikin - Tyazhyalov (most likely, to Nakin’s report of November 29):

“Your message has been received. The next task is to continue cleaning the settlements, primarily Mukhol...
Take measures to reconnoiter the Middle Balkaria - Zhemtala route, from where the bandits allegedly keep in touch with the Germans.
Immediately take measures to clean up the corpses, using the local population for this.
Pull out the cannon also by the forces of the population, if there is one left, if not, then keep it with you until a favorable moment.

- December 1 - The headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD sent a combat report to Nakin Shikin dated November 30.

- With the receipt of Shikin’s order of December 1, executions ceased, because all forces were transferred to the cleaning of corpses. The command understood that German troops could indeed come to the Cherek Gorge, and the corpses could become material evidence in the propaganda struggle.

- The men of Mukhol decided to get weapons and drive the Red Army men out of the village, saving it from arson. Most likely, the decision was unanimous, since even the old people supported it.
Mukhols (~20 people) went to Zhemtala through the Upper Blue Lakes. We met Yakub Zhangurazov with 2-3 attendants. He visited the Cherek Gorge as a German representative for the first time. Before the official entry of the German troops into the Cherek Gorge, the Muholtsy and Zhpnguzarov no longer crossed paths. We spent the night in the area Aul.

- December 2 - The headquarters of the 37th Army sent a report outlining the main points of the fight against banditry in the Cherek Gorge starting from November 21, using information sent to it by the headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD on December 1. The following numbers were indicated in the original: bandits - 600-700 people, killed - 1500 people. The signer of the document (the position and surname are not clear, since the entry was confiscated by the TsAMO of the USSR) personally corrected the data for 300 and 773. The correction was arbitrary since the headquarters of the 37th Army did not have any other data, except for the materials of the 11th SD of the NKVD.

- December 2 - Mukholtsy spent the day in the forest near the Upper Blue Lakes. With the onset of darkness, we went to the Zhemtala region.

- December 3 - Muholtsy received weapons and returned to the Zarashka area.

- December 3 - Nakin sent the third report to Shikin, according to which, he cleared Mukhol of bandits and their accomplices, and left the garrison (3rd squadron of the 17th command post).

- Nakin received a letter from the bandits, which he sent to Shikin. Nakin reported to the division commander:

“A gang of 97 was exterminated, some went to join the Germans in Zhemtala, the rest are trying to surrender ... I am collecting corpses.”

- December 3 - As a reaction to the report of the division commander on December 1, Kozlov’s order to Shikin followed. The commander demanded the establishment of the true situation, the clarification of information about the murdered accomplices of the bandits. He admitted that 1500 killed is too large a number; a useless sacrifice. He ordered Shikin to instruct the NKVD detachment not to touch the local population, which has nothing to do with the gang.

The commander’s order had no practical consequences. Presumably, the order was issued for self-justification, as an attempt to shift the blame on the direct executors - Shikin and Nakin. This is evidenced by the report of the senior political officer Seskov dated December 9, 1942, to the head of the political department of the 37th army, Osadchy. Carrying out the task of Osadchy, Seskov investigated the facts of unjustified executions and murders during the liquidation of gangs in the Middle Balkaria region and drew the following conclusions:

«one. I believe that Nakin’s detachment destroyed many innocent residents who were not at all connected with the bandits.
2. I consider the above figure of those killed [1,500 people] to be unrealistic, taken from the ceiling, in the sense of bragging to the authorities. If this number is correct, then 1010 people fall on the number of women and children killed.
3. The main fault that many innocent people suffered falls equally on the commander of the 11th SD Shikin and his deputy for political affairs as if they could not prevent innocent victims in a timely manner.

Subsequently, these conclusions were ignored, they tried to shift all the blame on the «bandits» in order to completely remove the responsibility of the entire command staff of the 37th Army, the 11th Division, and the battalion for what they had done. Documents show that the army command was aware of the Circassian events. There is no evidence that communication between Nakin and the headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD, between the headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD and the headquarters of the 37th Army was interrupted.

- Second half of the day, December 3 - Bondarev’s cover detachment in the Babugent area was divided by the Germans into two parts. One part retreated towards the plywood plant through the Upper Blue Lakes,
and the other (led by Captain Bondarev) - towards the South along the high road. The way to the Cherek and Khulamo-Bezengi gorges was opened to the Germans.

- December 4 - The rebels, consisting of residents of Mukhol and Teben-El + 7 men from Kosparta, set out from the village of Zarashky in the direction of the villages Shaurdat, ~40 people. They were armed with rifles and light machine guns. We approached the village of Shaurdat. After a short skirmish, Nakin’s people, who were engaged in arson, left the village without loss.
- The attack on Mukhol was carried out from the slope. The rebels did not know anything about Bondarev’s detachment (47 people), who arrived from Babugent to Mukhol and settled at the foot of the slope, on the path of the attackers. The fight lasted all day. Captain Bondarev was killed, 6 people were killed, and 8 were injured. There is no information about the wounded. At 19:00, Bondarev’s detachment under the command of Lieutenant Pozdnyakov withdrew from Mukhol in the direction of Sautu.

- Nakin reported to Shikin from Sautu: «Bondarev’s detachment left Babugent on 03.12.42 at 16:00 and arrived in Mukhol.» He reported that in connection with the withdrawal of Bondarev’s detachment, the bandits became more active, and he fought.

** The «bandits» became active not because of Bondarev’s retreat, but because they received weapons and decided to defend themselves.

- At 19:20 Kozlov demanded from Shikin (to whom Bondarev was subordinate) to restore the situation in Babugent. Find out under what circumstances the village was surrendered to the Germans. By this time, units of the 37th Army were leaving the Cherek Gorge and retreating to the Sukan Pass.

- 9:00, December 5 - Nakin reported to his superiors that the Germans had joined with the bandits (claiming that the number of Germans reached the battalion) and went on the offensive. He noted that 100 rebels penetrated from Bezengi, 200 - from Babugent.

This was not true. The Mukholians sent Khazhdaut Osmanov and Tokalay Uzeev for help towards Bezengi, but they could not cross the pass on horseback and returned by the end of the battle. There were no Germans in Bezengi and the Cherek Gorge. Nakin was simply justifying his retreat.

- The commander sent 2 orders to Shikin, demanding to destroy the road (tunnel) Babugent-Mukhol, to clear the Sautu area from the gangs at an accelerated pace, part of the forces of the 11th SD of the NKVD and the action of the Nakin detachment to clear the road from the plywood factory - Blue Lakes and free Babugent. The orders were not carried out.

- December 5 - The headquarters of the 37th Army reported that the detachment of 295 SD (Bondarev), according to preliminary data, was dismembered, the commander was killed, and the Germans penetrated Mukhol. Under the onslaught of the gang, reinforced by 500 Germans, a detachment of the 11th SD of the NKVD left Sauta and retreated to the pass. The number of «Germans» who «acted» against Nakin’s detachment together with the bandits grew from headquarters to headquarters, which was not true.

- «Assembly point» in the area «Ak-kaya-alli». Through it, the Cherek region was specially supplied with weapons.

- In Mukhol, 5 partisans from the Khulamo-Bezengievsky partisan detachment surrendered to the rebels. Three - residents of the village of Kashkatau, Khazhismail Konakozich Boziev (brother of the detachment commander), Khazhismail Khazhomarovich Nastaev, Kasim Chochaevich Chechenov; one is a resident of Gundelen, Nukh Alievich Zhanataev; one is a native of Nizhny Chegem, Kamu Aubekirovich Zhaboev. Shot on December 5 or 6 (the second date is more likely).

- 12:00, December 6 - Nakin took up the defense in the Upper. Zhemtala area. Residents began to return to the South.

- 8:40, December 7 - Kozlov ordered to establish contact with the company of the 1157th Infantry Regiment, located on the pass. Nakin’s detachment, together with her, was supposed to liberate the Middle Balkaria from the «bandits». The commander did not believe in the «Germans».
According to the army headquarters, there were 300 bandits in the Cherek Gorge, reinforced by at least 500 Germans. In order to knock them out of the gorge, Nakin’s detachment and a company of 1157 rifle regiments were not enough. The order was not executed.

- December 8 - The commander continued to demand action on the issue of cleaning the Middle Balkaria from «banditry».

- Residents began to gradually return to the villages. Prior to that, many lived outside the gorge in the kosh of their collective farms.

- December 10 - Probably, the German units entered the Cherek Gorge. According to the certificate, Mukhol was in occupation from December 10 to December 31, 1942. There were no Germans among the occupiers. The military units consisted of Romanians. Number: detachment guarding the pass + detachment in Zylgi.

- Many inhabitants descended from the mountains after the entry of German troops into the gorge. It took at least a week to search for and bury the dead. Burnt corpses/bones were removed from under a thick layer of earth that had collapsed from the roofs of houses. In the out at the first stage, even cattle were burned, until Nakin began to send him to headquarters. The construction of individual graves was abandoned. In Sautu and Glashevo, where most of the dead were, people were buried in trenches.

- December 14 - The 11th SD of the NKVD was liquidated. All its units were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 2nd Guards Division. Documents through the NKVD, received by the 11th SD or sent from its headquarters, were not found in the archives. All orders came from the 37th Army. The headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD reported only to the headquarters of the army.

- December 16 - The political department of the 37th Army sent a report «On the activation of gangs in the villages of Middle Balkaria and the fight against them by the detachment of the 11th SD of the NKVD» to the political department of the Transcaucasian Front and the political department of the Northern Group of Forces. The document gave a general description of banditry in the republic and the Cherek Gorge. Nakin’s actions are described. Truth and lies were mixed in the report. It follows from it that the activation of bandits in the Cherek region began after November 16: shelling of troops, arson, and so on.

The bandits seized «a gun of the 772nd Air Defense Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces with a crew, which, under the force of arms, forced them to fire on our unit, without fulfilling the demands of the bandits, they destroyed the crew, 2 Red Army soldiers fled from the massacre of the bandits.»

The text of the bandits’ letter dated November 28 is provided with the comment: “In turn, the group of the detachment operating in the villages in Glashevo and U. Cheget received an ultimatum letter from the headquarters of the gang, claiming to be German partisans operating in the rear of the Red Army.

- In the detachment of Nakin there were partisans from the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment. In accordance with the order signed by Kozlov and Kumekhov on November 6, the detachment was to be with Bondarev’s cover detachment.

BUT! On November 20, the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment joined the United Partisan Detachment in the area of ​​the plywood factory, and on November 28 it was included in the Nagorno-Zolsky partisan detachment as a branch. On November 28 + the next 6-8 days, the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment was not at the plywood factory, did not take part in the Zhemtal (night of November 27-28), and Lesken (December 4-5) operations.

- The Nagorno-Zolsky partisan detachment included 18 (17) people who remained in the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment after the execution of 5 partisans and the death of Kuchinsky in December. Adilbi Tumenov (was 18th) joined the detachment in Sauta and went to the plywood factory. Among these people were: 15 Balkars, 2 Russians, and 1 Kabardian.

- Six dead in December in the Joint Detachment of partisans from Khulam and Bezengi were not included in the list of casualties. The OPO, in order not to increase the indicators, continued to consider the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment an independent unit until the end of the Circassian operation.

- All partisans of the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment were awarded as fighters of the Nagorno-Zolsky partisan detachment.

- In the report of Kumekhov to Little on December 10, 1943, on the military operations of the Kabardino-Balkarian United Partisan Detachment: «Three German headquarters and one headquarters of bandits were destroyed during the actions.»

- According to information about the fighting of the partisans, the German headquarters (1 divisional and 2 battalion) were destroyed in the villages of Kamennomostsky, Labaza, and Zhemtala. The location of the headquarters of the bandits was not indicated, BUT it is possible to calculate. Shikin ordered Nakin to find and destroy the headquarters of the bandits in the Cherek Gorge. Consequently, if the OPO took credit for its destruction, then thereby recognizing participation in the Circassian operation, which was led by Nakin.

- At least 15 people from the OPO or people closely associated with it directly took part in the actions of Captain Nakin’s detachment in the Cherek Gorge from late November - to early December 1942. The highest party leadership of the republic (Kumekhov), the command of the United Partisan Detachment (Tsaryapin), the Commissariat Internal Affairs (Deputy People’s Commissar Borsokov) from the very beginning were in the know about events in the Cherek Gorge.

- After the change of power in the district, 5 elders were elected, several activists were arrested (they were released a week later at the request of the residents), and an NKVD worker of the Cherek district, Imangulov, was killed.

- The corpses of the Red Army and partisans were not removed until the German military rank-ordered. One of the residents was assigned to clean up the corpses; dragged into lime pits. Nakin’s people dragged corpses into houses in Sauta and burned them.

- Relatives of the partisans asked the new authorities for permission to take the corpses for burial. All five Balkars were buried in the Cherek Gorge and Kashkatau.

- The end of 1942 - the German garrison suddenly began to leave the Cherek Gorge, because of which the population became agitated. The inhabitants were afraid of the continuation of executions, expecting the appearance of the Red troops through the pass from the side of Zhemtala. Many families left the gorge and moved towards Babugent-Kashkatau. Through the efforts of the old men and some rebels, people were stopped and turned back. Many went to the mountain koshi out of fear.

- It was decided to set up military outposts at all entrances to the gorge, to assign certain people to the outposts for each village.

- Contrary to the assertions of the NKVD, the Germans did not warn the rebels of their retreat.

- No troops were used for duty at posts (only rebels). There were negotiations between the authorities and the rebels. This was later presented as holding up the advance of the Red Army units by the insurgents for a month. It was reported to Moscow: «The area was defended on the side of the rebels by 500 people.»

- 1943 - At the January plenum of the regional party committee, one of the Balkar leaders of the republic demanded to speak the language of weapons with the Chereks. The true reasons for the mass executions in the Cherek Gorge were not mentioned. All residents presented themselves as bandits and their accomplices. Both bandits and accomplices were threatened with 10 years in a forced labor camp.

- A few days after the January plenum, the 3rd battalion of the regiment of the VV NKVD of the USSR launched an attack on the gorge from three sides. After a short exchange of fire (according to the testimony of a participant, one Red Army soldier was killed and another was wounded), the troops entered the gorge. Residents came out to meet with red banners. The leadership of the republic, in its appeal to the inhabitants of the gorge, called for harmony and work, did not threaten. However, on February 6, general roundups and arrests of the entire male population began on the basis of the order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Filatov to seize «bandits, deserters and other anti-Soviet elements.» In the first stage, 324 people were arrested in the Cherek district, the main part was confiscated in the first couple of days, and the rest were caught in cats. Livestock was left without shepherds, which led to its great decline.

- Arrests were carried out according to pre-compiled lists. Soviet party activists and red partisans served as sources of information. Those arrested also included war invalids, women, and teenagers.

- Until the end of 1943, another 76 people were arrested. The total number of those seized in the Cherek Gorge in 1943: 400 people. Among those arrested were leaders of various levels (from foremen to heads of departments of district executive committees), who helped the arrests. Of the discovered lists of 355 arrested or subject to arrest: 35 - were passed as deserters, and the rest - were civilians.

- The OBB took on the operational account of all the «bandit rebels». These 400 people were not included, because were on a separate list.

- The number of the Cherek «bandit rebel» organization and the loss of Red Army units in battles with it changed upwards depending on the situation.

- In the data of the headquarters of the 37th Army and the headquarters of the 11th SD of the NKVD, an arbitrary number of «gang rebels» (600-700) was reduced to 300-400 (also arbitrary). Perhaps it was this number that was used as the basis for the activities of the NKVD bodies in the Cherek Gorge since the same number of arrests were made during the year (not counting the “bandit rebels” hiding in the mountains).

- Many of those arrested were distantly related to banditry, and were later released, but all 400 people appeared as bandits in a letter from Kumekhov, Bziava and Filatov addressed to Beria.
- April 10, 1944 - Speaking at the XIII Plenum of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Kumekhov said: «More than 600 armed bandits acted in the Cherek region alone.» How did the number come about: 400 arrested + “bandit rebels” (~ 140 people) + arrested on March 8, 1944; the amount was rounded up with the addition of the word «more».

- September 1944 - When the case of the legalized Balkarian bandits ended, the composition of the Cherek «bandit rebel organization» decreased. In the same document in the name of Beria, different numbers are named on different pages: 350 and 400 people, of which 141 went to the mountains «after the resistance was broken.» It turned out that among those arrested in 1943 there were 209-259 «bandits». However, according to the OBB NKVD KBASSR, only 141 people passed as bandits, the list of which was constantly updated.

- December 1946 - Speaking at the regional party conference, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Kabardian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Gorshkov, used the above data, but limited himself to the first number: «The anti-Soviet, bandit organization of the Cherek region consisted of over 350 bandits.»

However, later the OBB admitted: «We do not have accurate data on the quantitative composition of the bandit rebel formations on the territory of Balkaria in the period before the occupation (in the autumn of 1942).»

- At the beginning of 1947, the final results were summed up. The real data differed from the previously declared figures. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the KBASSR, 50 armed gangs consisting of 1170 people operated on the territory of the republic, of which 763 were Balkars. 27 groups of deserters and illegal immigrants, 357 people, were hiding in the mountains, among which there were no Balkars.
13 parachute-sabotage groups consisting of 89 people were thrown into the territory of the republic, of which 20 were Balkars (2-3 people from the Cherek region). Bottom line: out of 763 Balkar «bandits» on operational records in the Cherek district, there were 5 gangs consisting of 152 people.

- An analysis of all available lists of «bandit rebels» who were registered with the OBB NKVD KBASSR gave the same result, but it turned out differently. During the entire existence of the «bandit rebel movement» in the Cherek region, 157 people were registered or identified during legalization, 4 of them were held as lone bandits, the rest were divided into groups: Nogerov - 11, Tumenov - 42, Osmanov - 33, Ulbashev - 3, Zankishiev - 64 (+3 after the eviction of the Balkars). 154 bandits in total, of which: 1 Georgian, 1 Azerbaijani, 152 Balkars from the Cherek region (88 deserters, 3 teenagers under 16, 7 women, the rest are civilians). There were 123 people among those arrested and bandit rebels who passed as deserters.

The results were also summed up by the losses of the warring parties. In the document of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the KBASSR: “Over the entire period of the fight against banditry on the territory of the KBASSR, our losses amount to 57 people, of which: killed - 40 people. and 17 wounded. The loss of bandits with paratroopers only killed amounted to more than 150 people.

The data are taken from the documents of 1947, but earlier they had different meanings. In February 1944, in the above-mentioned report by Kumekhov and two People’s Commissars, which substantiated the need for the Balkars to be evicted from the republic, the Cherek region was noted, where «several fighters and commanders were killed in one clash and a unit of 80 people was disarmed», and «one of the bandit groups were headed by the chairman of the district executive committee.

BUT! The chairman of the Cherek district executive committee, Mechukuev (implied in the report), did not lead a bandit group and was never listed as a member of the bandit rebels.

- September 1944 - Bziava reported to Beria about the events of November 21, 1942: “In November 1942, the rebel organization, united by forces from the entire Cherek region, under the leadership of Yakub Zhangurazov, attacked and captured the regional center of the Cherek region - villages. Mukhol and Cherkesku district hospital, where the garrison was located. As a result of the fighting that took place on the part of the Red Army units, there were significant losses, more than 50 people were killed and captured, and the prisoners were shot. <...> “During the attack on the Red Army, up to 100 people were killed. commanders and Red Army soldiers, 11 Red Army soldiers and commanders were wounded, in addition, 30 Red Army soldiers and commanders were taken prisoner by bandits, of whom there were more than 20 people handed over to the Germans.

-1945 - Arrest of the Ulbashevs from the Shaurdat bandit group. They wrote about them:

“... they carried out 15 armed attacks on units of the Red Army, during which 120 officers, partisans, and nurses were killed and wounded. More than 180 rifles and various ammunition have been selected.
In addition, 45 armed raids were carried out on collective farms and state farms with the seizure and destruction of 2,500 heads of cattle and small cattle.

- Since February 1943, the inhabitants of the Cherek region have been treated as enemies to whom the laws do not apply. The new head of the OBB of the NKVD of the KBASSR, Captain Bizhev, demanded that when searching for bandits in mined areas, guides should first be allowed in, followed by fighters.

- Since April 1943, in order to facilitate knowledge or intimidation, NKVD workers chopped off and took away the heads of murdered bandits. In 1945, when a gang killed two members of another group in order to appropriate livestock, the OBB had to admit that “the heads of the bandits they shot were cut off and their belongings were burned in order to disguise their participation in the murder ... giving the impression to other bandits about the actions of the military divisions.»

- February 1943 - A new leadership began to work in the Cherek region. All key positions were assigned to outsiders. The first secretary is Zhanakait Zalikhanov (instead of Eneev).
Of the five members of the bureau of the RK VKP(b), three came from the Joint Partisan Detachment: the former commander of the Khulamo-Bezengievsky detachment Kh. Boziev - chairman of the RIK, Yu. Makitov - secretary of the RK VKP(b), M. Kushaev - head of the NKVD RO.

- The leadership of the district knew the details of the Cherek events: the perpetrators of the actions, more or less the exact number of human casualties, housing, and property losses.

- The following data was given in official documents of regional structures at different times:

The dead local residents - 393 (up to 16 years old - 162); 373; 458; 713; 723.
*Prior to the compilation of acts with lists from the health department, the number 713 was given as precisely established. After sending the lists, the executive committee used two numbers: «official» (373, 393, 458) and for internal use (713, 723).

Burnt houses - 400; 413; 519.

Cowless families (families that lost cows in November-December 1942) - 504 (267 military families).

- Summer 1943 - On instructions from Nalchik, in the Chereksky district, they began to draw up acts in which the murder of civilians, private and collective farm cattle stolen by the Nakin detachment and requisitioned by the retreating army, arson of houses and property were declared the work of the Germans and bandits. According to the testimony of Zalikhanov (former secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), the chairman of the RIC, Boziev, received the appropriate instructions from the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the KBASSR, Akhokhov. Boziev conveyed the instructions of the leadership to all the chairmen and secretaries of the village councils.

- A special commission with the chairmen and secretaries of the councils drew up hundreds of acts indicating the damage caused by the Germans and bandits to the property of citizens and collective farmers of the Cherek region. Two acts were devoted to executions: according to the village council of villages. V. Balkaria, village council - Cf. Balkaria. The blame was completely transferred to the Germans, Zhangurazov, Zankishiev, and Tabaksoev. The acts included lists of names of the dead.

- The Germans and accomplices (bandits) were credited with a reduction by 3/4 of the number of public livestock in the area: horses - by 891 heads, cattle - by 2,773 heads, sheep and goats - by 41,672 heads. The reduction took place until «the period of management in the area of ​​the Nazi invaders and their accomplices.» It was held in November, when the 37th Army, cut off from supply bases, which were in the territory of the region together with the leadership of the republic, received livestock for food. In the summer of 1943, there was no mention of the supply of livestock to the army in the field.

- October 15, 1942 - Kumekhov at the plenum of the regional committee said: «Mountain areas - Elbrus, Chegem, Chereksky - have best-preserved cattle.» Before the entry of the 37th Army, there were cattle in such quantities that could only be used by either the Red Army or the Germans. The Germans did not take cattle.

- According to the OBB, the Balkar bandits plundered 15,660 heads of large and small livestock and 778 horses. Data from the leadership of the district and the OBB came to Moscow through various channels.

!!! It was in 1943 that the entire documentation base for the eviction of the Balkar people was summed up. Basic data were collected in the Cherek region. It began with mass arrests carried out in early February on Filatov’s orders. During the year, 400 people were arrested, 316 of them seized before April 1. Regardless of the degree of guilt, they were considered as bandits or gang accomplices. !!!

- Spring-summer 1943 - At the direction of the leadership of the republic, everything done by the Nakin detachment and partisans in the Cherek Gorge was copied to the Germans and «bandit accomplices» headed by Zhangurazov, Zankishiev, Tabaksoev, Osmanov, and others.
- January 1943 - Kumekhov, Akhokhov, and Ulbashev told the residents of the Cherek region that Zankishiev and Tabaksoev were «the main culprits of the senseless bloodshed in November 1942.»

- The leadership of the Cherek region drew up several hundred acts and submitted them to the republican commission for establishing and investigating the atrocities of the Nazi invaders and their accomplices. Were approved. The summary data was transferred to Moscow. The commission was headed by Z. Kumekhov, Kh. Akhokhov, A. Sasikov, I. Ulbashev, S. Filatov. As a result of these actions, the crimes of the Cherek «bandit rebels» increased sharply. This happened against the backdrop of the existing «bandit groups» and the corresponding reports of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Bziava, sent by him to Moscow. For the entire period of Bziava’s work as People’s Commissar, not a single Balkar citizen (man, woman, teenager - it doesn’t matter) was put on operational records as a deserter or illegal immigrant, only as a bandit.

- June 1943 - Bziava - Beria: “The undercover and operational measures carried out so far are not sufficient and do not provide both the elimination of existing gangs and the localization of the local population’s tendency to desert from the Red Army and evade draft and mobilization, subsequently replenishing and increasing the number of currently existing bandit groups.

- According to the OBB, the headquarters of Zankishiev’s gang was located in Sauta in the house of Gumaev Mustafa Sarbievich. The house was burned down by Nakin’s men. Perhaps, together with the partisans, since they took credit for the destruction of the headquarters of the bandits.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS
- During the period of implementation of socio-economic, political, and cultural transformations, national characteristics, religious and traditional foundations, features of the economic and everyday life were not taken into account. Forced collectivization, propaganda of atheism, the priority of class interests, the persecution of dissent caused protest and contributed to the formation of anti-state phenomena.

- Mistakes and miscalculations by the commanders of the Red Army during combat operations contributed to desertion. Example: The 115th Kabardino-Balkarian division, August 1942, was sent against tank columns of German troops. As the 37th Army retreated and the front approached Kabardino-Balkaria, the number of deserters increased.

- The deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the workers, the crisis of party and state structures in Kabardino-Balkaria occupied by the Germans, the mistakes made during the legalization of deserters, the murder of civilians led to an aggravation of the crime situation in the Cherek region.

- November 27 - December 4, 1942 - A combined detachment of the 11th SD of the NKVD under the command of Captain Nakin with the participation of ~ 15 partisans from the Joint Partisan Detachment of Kabardino-Balkaria, under the pretext of fighting banditry in the Cherek Gorge, ~ 700 inhabitants were shot (by name 377 were installed, including 155 children under 16), more than 519 houses with property and outbuildings were burned, a significant amount of livestock was stolen.

Subsequently, the command of the division and the army substantiated the facts of the mass execution by the «active resistance» of the bandits to the Nakin detachment. Which is not true, because Nakin’s detachment waged war on the civilian population, and until December 4, 1942, not a single bandit was killed by the Red Army.

- The events of 1943, at the direction of the party and Soviet leadership of the republic, were documented by the regional authorities with acts as a crime of the Germans and their accomplices-bandits of the Cherek region. As a result, events were distorted in historical and memoir literature.

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